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ABSTRACT

In order to support emerging network businesses, such as Voice-over-IP (VoIP), virtual learning, video conferencing, and
telemedicine, the Internet has to provide classes of service that are better than traditional ‘best-effort’ service. In computer
networks, Quality of Service (QoS) is defined as the mechanisms that allow differentiation of network services based on their
unique service requirements. To provide QoS over the current Internet, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and
others have proposed a number of architectures, including Integrated Service (IntServ) and Differentiated Service (DiffServ).
This research examines the basic issue of designing pricing models for Internet services at various quality levels. By
formulating a pricing formula that is based on price-quality schema drawn from marketing theory, this research provides a
unique approach to understand the pricing of Internet services. The pricing model in this research provides a flexible and
dynamic capability to develop Internet pricing for upcoming digital economy.
Keywords

Quality of Service (QoS), Communication Network, Network Service Pricing, Dynamic Pricing
INTRODUCTION

When the digital economy is defined as the economy that is based on the creation and exchange of digitized information
(Zimmermann 2000), communication networks, especially the Internet, have important roles in this new economic model.
Network service providers should develop new services to improve the exchange of information and create value through
existing infrastructures. By providing different levels of service (QoS), network service providers can develop new sources of
profit for themselves, and the companies who are using these new structures can develop new digital products and services
that were not possible with the previous best-effort networks.
We observed that the technical solutions are there, but the network service providers (NSP) are reluctant to provide these new
services, partially because of the lack of proper pricing mechanisms. By proper pricing mechanism we mean that the pricing
strategies should be logical and persuasive for customers, economical to compensate the service costs of the network services,
and profitable to allow competition in the market and bring competitive advantages to the companies.
Pricing a product or a service is a difficult but important task for an organization. With the right pricing, a company can
acquire customers, retain them, and make profits. Therefore, a pricing strategy provides a “bottom line” for the business and
maintains customer “goodwill” (Lewis and Shoemaker 1997). Pricing has been considered to be “difficult to imitate and a
source of sustainable competitive advantage” (Dutta, Bergen, Levy, Ritson, and Zbaracki 2002).
Traditional pricing of Internet service is has focused on recovering costs or maximizing profits (MacKie-Mason and Varian
1995). The pricing theories that are based on economics assume rational behavior and utility maximization of the participants
in the ‘ perfect’ market (Monroe 2003). The price is supposed to be changed according to the demand and supply functions
of the market (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 2001; Monroe 2003). However, after the privatization of communication networks and
remarkable technical developments, network service providers have suffered from the lack of adequate and practical pricing
model for their services (Odlyzko 2001).
Compared to the previous decade’s communication network that is data centric, the current Internet users often transmit voice
and video along with data. Voice and video communications are more stringent in their quality requirements than data. They
are more sensitive to delays and require reliable transmission of the packets. Because the characteristics of traffic have
changed, we need some reconsideration of the implications of architecture, service classes, and design principles on the
pricing models of Internet service providers (Blumenthal and Clark 2001).
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QUALITY OF SERVICE NETWORK

In earlier days, Quality of Service (QoS) meant delivering packets from the source to the destination without any
transmission errors. As the Internet has become commercialized, however, QoS has started to become an important strategic
tool for market competition (Ferguson and Huston 1998).
Current Internet provides ‘best-effort’ service for packet transmissions. Although, the last mile connection speed from
Internet Service Provider (ISP) to customer could be different, the core network provides same quality of service for all
packets regardless of the characteristics of the packets.
To support QoS network, two improvements to the level of service have been proposed. Integrated Services (IntServ) uses a
resource reservation mechanism and provides connection-oriented services as do traditional telephone networks (Ferrari and
Verma 1990; Braden, Clark and Shenker 1994).
Differentiated Service (DiffServ) marks each incoming packet based on the service requirement of the packet (Bernet, Binder,
Blake, Carlson, Davies, Ohlman, Verma, Wang, and Weiss 1998). Intermediate routers interpret the marking information and
provide a predefined service that is known as Per-Hop-Behavior (PHB) (Striegel and Manimaran 2002). Table 1 shows the
differences between different QoS architectures that are compared with the traditional best effort service network.

Approach
Best Effort

QoS Specification

Strength

Weakness

TCP/IP

Simple

Overprovision of the network resource

De facto Standard

Service quality is not
guaranteed
Network resources are
overused.

Error checking and retransmission
IntServ/ RSVP1
DiffServ/ BB2

Reserve network resources per call

Guaranteed performance

Lack of scalability

Connection oriented and refresh regularly

Stable communication

Complex management

DiffServ Code Point (DSCP)

Scalable and flexible

Lack of performance guarantee

Per-Hop-Behavior (PHB)
Connectionless management
Table 1. Summary of the Quality of Service Architecture

INTERNET SERVICE PRICING FOR QOS NETWORK

Current Internet pricing has two forms, flat rate pricing and usage-based pricing. Flat rate pricing is simple to understand and
easy to implement (Wiseman 2000). All customers are charged equally by some criterion such as connection speed,
connection time, or connected location. There is empirical evidence that consumers prefer a simple flat price, even if they
have to pay a higher price (Altmann and Chu 2001; Odlyzko 2001). This phenomenon explains the importance of the
certainty or price predictability. In addition, network service providers can save costs for accounting and management with
flat rate pricing mechanism. Since simple pricing promotes the overall network usage, network service providers can make
more profit (Wiseman 2000).
However, flat rate pricing does not reflect the current congestion level, and cannot solve the network congestion problem. All
packets are treated equally in this mechanism and there is no chance to select a different service class. The classic problem of
the “tragedy of the commons” cannot be prevented in the flat rate pricing mechanism (Odlyzko 2001).
With a usage based pricing scheme, customers would pay for what they actually use. Although usage based pricing is
beneficial to customers and network service providers, they do not welcome this pricing scheme (DaSilva 2000). Customers
want to have simple and predictable pricing plans rather than complex and possibly more expensive ones. A reasonable and
understandable approach to pricing based on quality and service demand is needed.

1
2

RSVP: Resource reSerVation Protocol
BB: Bandwidth Broker
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Adapting consumer perception theory from marketing literature (Lewis and Shoemaker 1997; Monroe 2003), this research
proposes a reasonable and scalable pricing model for Quality of Service (QoS) network service providers. To maximize the
profit, network service providers should design pricing strategy to reflect the willingness to pay of their customers.
RESEARCH QUESTION

Although QoS mechanisms are available in technical documentations, there are few practical QoS network. It is partially
because of the lack of proper pricing (Crowcroft, Hand, Mortier, Roscoe, and Warfield 2003). QoS pricing is difficult to
develop since QoS network is dynamic and the service performance of QoS network is unpredictable in advance. This
research has the questions that how to design effective QoS pricing mechanism. While other researches on Internet pricing
focused on one side of pricing, this research tried to include both sides of network congestion control and profit maximization.
THEORETICAL FOUNDATION: QOS PRICING WITH PRICE-QUALITY SCHEMA

In marketing, price has been determined to be an important cue for perceived product quality (Monroe 1990; Lewis and
Shoemaker 1997; Rao, Qu and Ruekert, 1999; Brouthers, Werner and Matulich, 2000; Kirmani and Rao 2000; Varki and
Colgate 2001). Consumers assume a positive relationship between quality and cost, although the quality and cost relationship
was not always true for certain products in past years. For example, luxury automobiles such as Rolls Royce and Bentley are
sold at a higher price but the actual quality may not justify this price.
When the market price is high it changes the consumers’ perceptions about the quality of the product (Monroe 2003). A
different pricing strategy provides an “imaginary effect” on perceptions of quality and leads to a willingness to buy (Naipaul
and Parsa 2001). Most network pricing researchers assume that when the price is high the arrival rate or demand for that
service class is low (Keon and Anandalingam 2003). However, this assumption may not be always true. Some customers
value high quality services more than lower-class services. Therefore, some people buy more expensive services because they
believe that they can get better quality of service by paying more.
In many cases, price signals the quality of product and services that the user can expect to receive. When there is a strong
relationship between price and quality perception, some people would buy more products and services even the price is
relatively high. Therefore, network service providers can increase profit by charging higher prices for premium services.
However, they can’t improve the service quality infinitely because the network bandwidth or the network resources are
limited. Therefore, the pricing question should address how to maximize the profit within the limited capacity of the service
network.
RESEARCH MODEL

We assume that when the quality of network services is known, we can determine prices for those services based on observed
network parameters, actual service quality delivered, and market perceptions of the price. In other words, when we know the
service quality, we can set the price through a certain formula of market indices and quality indicators. Figure 1 shows the
simulated network model for this research.
Service Provider Network

Application Server

Bottleneck Link

LAN
Router

Router

Application Server

Figure 1. Simulated Network Service Model
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Assumptions

We assume there is a single network that has only one path from the source to the destination. The reason for this assumption
is partially because this research is not related to the network routing problem but network service pricing. Therefore, the
number of links or the complexity of the network architectures is not directly related to the research domain.
We assume that there are m independent traffic flows in n network service classes. The jth traffic flow in the ith service class
has unique service requirements that can be represented by average bandwidth requirement dij bits per second.
Let ki represent the number of flows in ith service class, then demand of ith service class ui can be defined as follows:
ki

ui =

∑d
j =1

j
i

, where i = 1, …, n and j = 1, …, m

(1)

n

∑k

i

=m

(2)

i =1

Proposition 1

The service quality of jth flow in ith class, Qij, is defined as the ratio of the served or fulfilled bandwidth, dij*, to requested
bandwidth, dij, of the flow.
j*

Qij =

d , where i = 1, …, n and j = 1, …, m
d
i

(3)

j

i

0 ≤ Qij ≤ 1

(4)

When the network is over-provisioned, we can set the service quality to 1, which means 100% service quality. The rationale
for this definition is that once the service quality is 100%, more capacity does not lead to any performance improvement for
the traffic. The actual bandwidth, dij*, is obtained in real time. In our case, we use simulation to obtain values for dij*.
Qij = 1, when dij* ≥ dij

(5)

Proposition 2

The summation of the fulfilled bandwidth makes the total bandwidth consumption of ith service class, ui*. The unit of ui* is
bits per second (bps).
ki

ui* =

∑d
j =1

j*
i

, where I = 1, …, n and j = 1, …, m

(6)

Also it should be noted that the ui* must be less than the bottleneck capacity Cbottleneck since the network can’t transmit more
than its bottleneck link capacity at any time.
n

∑ u i * ≤ C bottlenecklink

(7)

i =1

Proposition 3

The quality index Iqi of the ith service class is defined as the average of service quality Qij.

ki

Iqi =

∑Q
j =1

k

j
i

(8)

i

0 ≤ Iqi ≤ 1

(9)

Proceedings of the Tenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, New York, New York, August 2004

2564

Byun et al.

A Strategic Pricing for QoS Network Business

For example, when we have 3 service classes, there are Iq1, Iq2, and Iq3 respectively. Iqi represents the average QoS level of the
ith service class.
Proposition 4

We propose that the price of ith service class is based on the service quality of the class. In the equation, Pi is the price for bits
per second of the ith service class.
Pi = α + βi * Iqi

(10)

α is the base price for a bit transmission (or any unit for quality) when there is no service guarantee (Iqi = 0; i.e. best effort
service). It provides the lower bound price of the unreliable service. βi is the quality premium for service class i when the
service has quality difference (Iqi > 0). Therefore, α + βi is the upper bound price for perfect service of Iqi = 1.
The total revenue Ri of ith service class is defined as the product of the price and the total number of transmitted bits in ith
service class.
Ri = Pi * ui*

(11)

n

R=

∑R

(12)

i

i =1

RESEARCH MODEL

The proposed goal of a network service provider is to maximize the revenue function R in equation (12) with different level
of prices and quality indices. The network service providers can develop different sets of α and β according to the QoS level
of their networks.
n

Maximize R

∑R

=

(13)

i

i =1
n

∑P * u*

=

i

i

i =1

n

∑ (α + β i * I q i ) * u i *

=

i =1

Subject to
n

∑ u i * ≤ C bottlenecklink
i =1

0 ≤ Iqi ≤ 1 for ∀ i
Pi ≥ Pi-1 for i > 1
i

i −1

Iq ≥ Iq

for i > 1

The last two constraints explain one might charge premium price for high quality service. A network service provider may
find the solution for this maximization function with various constraints such as network resource limitations, customer price
sensitivity, and different network performance level. Although the entire model is an optimization problem, we are not
solving this problem by using integer programming. Instead we will consider the various combinations of α and β according
to the different service quality.
About α

We define α as the base or floor price of a network service. When service quality level equals to zero (Iqi = 0) or can’t be
guaranteed, the price for that service equals α, which is greater than zero. Since the current Internet can’t guarantee a
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specified level of service quality, α should be equivalent to the price of best-effort (BE) service in the current Internet
architecture.
To profitably provide communication services, the total revenue should be greater than the total cost of services. Therefore, α
should be greater than the production cost of the service. The following equation shows the unit production cost of the
service and α should be greater than the unit production cost.

α

≥

Total Cost
---------------------------Network Capacity

(14)

Since the network capacity is bounded by the bottleneck link of the entire path from the source to the destination, α should be
equivalent to the following equation.

α

≥

Total Cost
-------------------------------------Bottleneck Link Capacity

(15)

α is the minimum price of service class i when Iqi = 0. In a short run, α couldn’t be changed flexibly since the network
capacity can’t be changed so fast to fulfill the demand fluctuations. Therefore, α should be fixed and used for production cost

recovery and providing reasonable service margin.
About β

βi denotes the quality premium of service class i that have Iqi service performance. βi can be fixed for all service classes.
βi = K (i = 1 ~ n) where K is constant.

(16)

In this case, the different service class will be charged uniformly according to its service quality level.

βi

βi

K

Iqi

1

βi

Iqi

1

Iqi

1

Figure 2. Various βi by service quality

Sometimes, we need to differentiate βi in accordance with corporate strategies. When a service provider wants to encourage
or discourage the usage level of certain service classes, βi can be adjusted. There are two cases to consider. The first case is
when we need to reserve the high quality service and make the performance better in that class, we can charge a significantly
higher price for the service. In this case the high quality service users are charged exponentially, since the equation of (10)
shows the price is the sum of α and the product of β and Iqi. When the β is increasing according to Iqi, the price P is increased
as a product of the two.
The other extreme case that decreasing βi with increasing Iqi could not happen in real situation because soon customers will
prefer the higher Iqi with lower βi.

βi can be determined by setting total revenue in advance. In this case, the service provider defines its profit goal with cost and
appropriate profit margin.
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n

When R = Rfixed

∑P * u*

=

(17)

i

i

i =1

n

∑ (α + β i * I q i ) * u i *

=

i =1

In the above equation, α is equal to the total cost / ui*. Iqi and ui* are obtainable with network simulation, and therefore we
can specify the βi. Rfixed is a constant pre-defined profit goal by the network service provider.
About Price (P)

We conducted simulation experiments to obtain specific results. Table 2 shows example pricing strategies for a network
service provider. The service provider can specify α and β as fixed or variable. α could be fixed when the network service
provider wants to recover its cost of service. However, when there is market competition the network service provider may
differentiate α to compete in the market. It means the network service provider might provide its service with the price below
the production costs, i.e., at a loss. In the long run a company can’t survive without cost recovery.
When β is fixed, a user can select a QoS class according to his preferences and budget constraints. Each service class has a
different price that is proportional to the service quality. Each service class has the same marginal cost of service quality.
The network service provider can make β vary to promote specific service classes. If the β is increasing with Iqi, the unit price
of high quality class services is more expensive than the unit price of lower class. If the β is decreasing with higher Iqi, the
network service provider promotes the usage of higher QoS class service.

α
fixed
β

fixed
variable

variable

α+β*

Iqi

αi + β * Iqi

User can select the class

α + βi *

Iqi

i

Promote certain service

Recover cost

αi + βi * Iq

Market competition

Table 2. Pricing Strategies Examples

SIMULATION RESULTS

We used the OPNET program as the simulation tool. OPNET software is a network simulation program, which is used by
various service providers and network research institutions (OPNET 2002).
There are six common applications such as e-mail, database, file transfer (FTP), web browsing, voice-over-IP, and video
conferencing that originate from workstations in a local area network (LAN). Each application has specific requirements such
as bandwidth, delay, jitter, and data loss. These configurations are similar to the statistical characteristics of real world
applications (OPNET 2002). All applications share limited network links and are competing for network resources such as
bandwidth, processors, and buffer. Therefore, a link between network routers is congested as a bottleneck always.
The LAN is connected to a switch that is connected to an ingress router of the network service provider. There are two core
routers in the service network and an egress router that are connected to the servers. The Ethernet server serves four
applications that are not so sensitive to the delay and jitter. The video station and voice station provide the client level video
conferencing application and voice over IP service respectively.
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Figure 3. Network Model Configuration with OPNET

For the simulation experiment, we set up two different network models; one for best effort (BE) and the other one for a
DiffServ-based QoS network. The model doesn’t include the IntServ QoS model since the IntServ architecture has scalability
problems in practice and this study is intended to be applicable to any network architecture that provides different level of
QoS.
Theoretically, BE networks do not need any QoS mechanisms that could support different users. In reality, however, the
actual network router has limited buffer size that can hold only limited numbers of packet at any moment. FIFO (First In First
Out) rule is applied to BE network and the last packet in the queue that exceeds the limited buffer size will be dropped.
Compared to BE networks, the DiffServ network could have various QoS mechanisms such as queuing, packet classification,
and packet dropping rule per each hop. Queuing mechanism provides the transmission rules of packet. Each packet is queued
according to specifically predefined rules such as arrival order (FIFO), priority (PQ: Priority Queue), packet class (CQ: Class
Queue), and others (WFQ: Weight Fair Queue).
As another QoS tool, we used Committed Access Rate (CAR). CAR limits the incoming and outgoing traffic by using
various criteria such as the interface, QoS group, and IP precedence information. When the traffic is in the predefined agreed
or committed rate range, CAR transmits the conformed traffics into the network. If the traffic exceeds the rate range, CAR
will drop or change the priority of the traffic and send it as low priority traffics.
We applied Random Early Detection (RED) as a mechanism to prevent TCP synchronization failure by dropping packets
randomly in advance (Floyd and Jacobson 1993). Once certain threshold is reached, the router starts to randomly drop some
of the packets in its queue. The TCP applications in the end nodes notice this dropping and reduce their transmission rate.
We developed 17 scenarios with different QoS settings (Table 3). Each scenario has unique QoS mechanisms such as
queuing, random early detection, and committed access rate.

Proceedings of the Tenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, New York, New York, August 2004

2568

Byun et al.

A Strategic Pricing for QoS Network Business

No Scenario Name

Queuing

CAR

WRED

Category

1

Baseline

-

-

-

No QoS

2

FQ_NC_NW

FIFO

No CAR

No WRED

Queuing

3

PQ_NC_NW

Priority Queue

No CAR

No WRED

4

CQ_NC_NW

Custom Queue

No CAR

No WRED

5

WQ_NC_NW

Weighted Queue

No CAR

No WRED

6

FQ_C_NW

FIFO

CAR

No WRED

7

PQ_C_NW

Priority Queue

CAR

No WRED

Queuing &
CAR

8

CQ_C_NW

Custom Queue

CAR

No WRED

9

WQ_C_NW

Weighted Queue

CAR

No WRED

10

FQ_NC_W

FIFO

No CAR

WRED

11

PQ_NC_W

Priority Queue

No CAR

WRED

12

CQ_NC_W

Custom Queue

No CAR

WRED

13

WQ_NC_W

Weighted Queue

No CAR

WRED

14

FQ_C_W

FIFO

CAR

WRED

15

PQ_C_W

Priority Queue

CAR

WRED

CAR
WRED

16

CQ_C_W

Custom Queue

CAR

WRED

17

WQ_C_W

Weighted Queue

CAR

WRED

Queuing &
WRED

Queuing

Table 3. Network Simulation Scenarios

Table 4 shows a sample performance metrics of e-mail application for each scenario. To calculate the adequate pricing
strategy the results of Table 5 are compared with the results of Table 4.
Application

Scenario

E-Mail

Baseline (dij)

Traffic (bytes/sec)
Sent

Received

Response Time
(sec)

6.10

6.10

2.234838439

FQ_NC_NW

8.32

4.72

0.208857893

PQ_NC_NW

89.43

106.81

9.420833711

CQ_NC_NW

85.93

90.01

9.034450505

WQ_NC_NW

102.44

89.54

29.242994717

FQ_C_NW

127.53

120.46

10.978689566

PQ_C_NW

106.69

99.83

9.290626928

CQ_C_NW

114.38

126.33

11.825723516

WQ_C_NW

105.74

86.29

29.806137322

FQ_NC_W

41.65

14.66

7.922248958

PQ_NC_W

100.97

107.21

7.875902969

CQ_NC_W

29.95

23.42

1.796027971

WQ_NC_W

11.66

5.29

-

FQ_C_W

20.86

20.90

3.156187046

PQ_C_W

19.19

16.23

3.798155261

CQ_C_W

22.53

24.17

1.333995885

WQ_C_W

8.37

5.55

-

Table 4. E-Mail Application Performance
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Table 5 shows the performance percentage of e-mail application. The performance of e-mail application is averaged of sent
and received traffic.
Qij

Scenario

3

Adjusted Qij

Average Qij

Sent

Received

Sent

Received

BaseLine

36.67%

45.62%

36.67%

45.62%

41.15%

FQ_NC_NW

50.00%

35.28%

50.00%

35.28%

42.64%

PQ_NC_NW

537.35%

798.44%

100.00%

100.00%

100.00%

CQ_NC_NW

516.35%

672.83%

100.00%

100.00%

100.00%

WQ_NC_NW

615.56%

669.33%

100.00%

100.00%

100.00%

FQ_C_NW

766.30%

900.49%

100.00%

100.00%

100.00%

PQ_C_NW

641.09%

746.30%

100.00%

100.00%

100.00%

CQ_C_NW

687.30%

944.33%

100.00%

100.00%

100.00%

WQ_C_NW

635.34%

645.05%

100.00%

100.00%

100.00%

FQ_NC_W

250.26%

109.56%

100.00%

100.00%

100.00%

PQ_NC_W

606.70%

801.41%

100.00%

100.00%

100.00%

CQ_NC_W

179.96%

175.07%

100.00%

100.00%

100.00%

WQ_NC_W

70.04%

39.52%

70.04%

39.52%

54.78%

FQ_C_W

125.32%

156.25%

100.00%

100.00%

100.00%

PQ_C_W

115.30%

121.30%

100.00%

100.00%

100.00%

CQ_C_W

135.39%

180.64%

100.00%

100.00%

100.00%

WQ_C_W

50.26%

41.51%

50.26%

41.51%

45.89%

j

Table 5. Application Performance (Qi ) for E-Mail

After we calculate performance for each application by scenario, we created the following table 6 for the QoS class service
performance for each scenario.

Scenario

Class
BE

FQ_NC_NW

AF
EF

Application

Average Qij

E-Mail

42.64%

FTP

43.33%

DB

31.40%

Web Browsing

6.20%

VoIP

0.00%

Video Conferencing

100.00%

Iqi
42.99%
18.80%
50.00%

ui*
6.52
4.87
18.04
10.04
920.18
401978.61

Table 6. FQ_NC_NW Scenario Simulation Results

Finally, Table 7 shows the pricing comparisons between traditional best effort network and QoS network. Both pricing
scheme is usage based. However, in QoS pricing mechanism, network service provider could have more revenue.

3

Adjusted Qij is calculated by the equation (5).

Proceedings of the Tenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, New York, New York, August 2004

2570

Byun et al.

A Strategic Pricing for QoS Network Business

Traditional usage based pricing

QoS pricing

(FQ_NC_NW)

(α = $ 0.1/bps and β = $ 0.05)

Class

Usage (bps)

Price

Revenue

Revenue

Price

Usage (bps)

Class

BE

402938.26

$0.12

$48,352.59

$1.38
$3.07

$0.12

11.39

BE

$0.11

28.08

AF

$50,362.35

$0.13

402898.79

EF

[Table 7] BE pricing and QoS pricing (FQ_NC_NW)

In the previous comparison tables we changed the QoS pricing based on the service quality differences of the class. The
important point of this simulation study is that the service provider has a valid set of pricing rules that enable its pricing
changes according to the service quality difference. Another strength of this pricing mechanism is its flexibility. When there
is any change of service level, network service providers can adjust their service pricing promptly. If a network service
provider has a service level agreement (SLA) with its customers, the network service providers can adjust the price without
notifying customers. Therefore, this pricing mechanism is dynamic and usage based that could control the network
congestion promptly.
CONCLUSION

In this research we proposed a simple but robust pricing scheme for the QoS mechanism over the current Internet
architecture. Since the Internet is very unpredictable in its performance and service quality, the designing of proper pricing
schemes can be complex and challenging. We adapted the quality index into the pricing formula directly instead of using a
complex mathematical formula. Therefore, our model is simple and dynamic in nature. When there are any changes in the
quality of Internet service, our pricing model can reflect the fluctuation of the service quality.
Our model provides dynamic pricing with a price-quality schema. Therefore, it can provide a better solution for the current
QoS pricing scenarios. We simulated the model communication network with OPNET program that is the widely used
simulation program for network performance simulation. The results show the possible changes in service pricing and the
associated total revenue changes.
Future research may address multiple routes from the source applications since such a scenario is a more realistic situation
and practical environment. When there is significant complexity of a network routing problem, the service performance will
be changed and therefore, the pricing could be also affected.
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